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 1 Intelligence and the just war
tradition 
The need for a flexible ethical 
framework 
 Ross Bellaby 
 Introduction 
It is impossible to think of one “just war doctrine”, with a single point of lineal 
development from a single idea. Rather, “just war” is better thought of as a set of 
“recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare . . . reflecting a general 
philosophical orientation towards the subject” ( Clark 1988 , 31) – a collection of 
underlying ethical arguments that have evolved over time in response to security 
challenges. As a broad body of thought the just war tradition “remains one of 
the most popular frameworks for evaluating the morality of war and warfare” 
( Fitzsimmons 2015 , 1069); 1 influencing and becoming reflected in political rheto-
ric and legal cannon.2 Indeed, many theorists have adapted the just war tradition 
to tackle emerging ethical-security problems of the day, from acts of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism policy, 3 drone warfare,4 biosecurity, 5 private military com-
panies6 and civil wars.7 
For intelligence the ethical dilemma faced includes recognizing and reconcil-
ing that it necessarily includes practices that “unavoidably entail doing some-
thing that is seriously contrary to the moral rules accepted as governing most 
human activity” ( Quinlan 2007 , 2) with the argument that without secret intelli-
gence states cannot “understand sufficiently the nature of some important threats” 
( Omand 2007 , 116). That on the one hand it can be argued that over the last cen-
tury intelligence has become one of the most vital tools a political community has 
in providing timely information designed to serve and protect its members and, 
as such, represents an ethical good. While on the other hand, it can also be argued 
that secret intelligence often necessarily involves violating people’s vital interest 
in privacy and autonomy and so there should be limits on its use. There is a need, 
therefore, for an ethical framework that can evaluate and reconcile these two ten-
sions, offering both a limitation on the harm that is caused by intelligence collec-
tion, while also outlining exactly when this harm is justified. By establishing the 
criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportion-
ality and discrimination, it can be argued that the harm intelligence can cause is 
limited while also outlining if and when its use is justified. 
There are, however, some key concerns levied at using the just war tradition 
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them is that intelligence is not a war. That is, a lot of what intelligence does 
focuses on domestic surveillance with activities closer to police work; it is not 
on a battlefield, weighing up the costs of killing the soldier in front of you, but 
rather involves extensive and systematic collection of data. Intelligence is not 
necessarily about examining the ethical cost of killing an individual in order to 
protect one’s own or another’s life. It is about data collection and analysis in order 
to prevent threats from actually causing significant harm to another. For some, 
therefore, it is better if intelligence was located within the political as compared to 
the security sphere, where questions on its activity should reflect existing domes-
tic oversight structures. There are concerns that equating intelligence with war 
makes its activities too permissive; the supreme emergency often associated with 
war heightens the pressure to act and lowers the ethical threshold, making it an ill 
fit for a broad set of activities which are often carried out in times of peace and 
against one’s own population. 
However, while intelligence is not war, it is also not police work. Indeed, 
although it is actually difficult to place a clear set of boundaries around what intel-
ligence is – as it ranges from data collection and analysis to more active forms of 
paramilitary operations – intelligence is quintessentially an activity that concerns 
itself with “national security”, dealing with threats greater in their impact both in 
terms of areas of national importance and number of people affected. It is tasked 
with detecting threats that can represent a significant harm to a large number of 
individuals and works within the national security infrastructure to provide secu-
rity to the community as a whole. The argument put forward here, therefore, is 
that by looking at the underlying tensions presented by intelligence activity and 
the justifications found within the just war tradition a set of specialized just intel-
ligence principles can be established. 
Indeed, on a theoretical level the just war tradition gives an important starting 
point in the need to understand the fundamental harm caused to the individual – 
that is, the impact it has on our most fundamental vital interests – and how this 
relates to the harm that the national security agenda is seeking to prevent. Just 
as the just war tradition recognizes a general presumption against killing to be 
justified within a set of given limits, the impacts of secret keeping on people’s 
autonomy and other vital interests means there is also a general presumption 
against secrecy unless a direct justification is given ( Calhoun 2001 ). The tradition 
then invites us to break down the justification into a set of ethical sub-questions 
and debates to be had that, in combination, provide an extensive understanding 
as to whether the act is just or not. These criteria are well versed in dealing with 
the types of ethical debates that are raised in the security sphere, drawing on both 
absolutist and utilitarian questions and concerns. For example, the principle of 
just cause asks us to consider the underlying reason given for why the harm is 
justified, drawing on wider ethical arguments on self-defence and the duty of 
the state to protect the political community, explored through hypotheticals and 
real-life or historical cases to understand what reasons are justifiable for differ-
ent acts. The principle of legitimate authority places the political community at 
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those external structures that are pulled into the protective shield of secrecy to 
lose much of their potency. While the principle of proportionality delineates what 
costs and benefits should be included in the calculation and ensures that the over-
all benefit is in the positive, the principle of discrimination seeks to distinguish the 
rights and obligations the state has to different groups of people, outlining who is 
a legitimate target and who is protected. Not only does the just war tradition direct 
us to ask certain ethical questions that are relevant in the security world but it also 
establishes a body of thought to guide the types of debates we should be having, 
and the variety of answers available to us. 
One important difference, however, between war and intelligence is that in the 
former there is a sharp distinction between the justice of going to war,  jus ad 
bellum, and the justice of actions within war,  jus in bello. This distinction does 
not work when we consider cyber-intelligence collection. There is not the same 
division between evaluating and sanctioning the general act of intelligence col-
lection and the carrying out of the variety of acts under this authorization that is 
seen with war. There is no “time of war/time of peace” distinction for intelligence, 
but rather operations are running continuously. So, with intelligence, the evalu-
ation must be done continuously, whereby each operation must fulfil all the just 
cyber-intelligence principles described later, with an operation being sanctioned 
according to who is being targeted, taking into account whether there is a specific 
just cause for the operation, ensuring that there is a right intention, and that the 
method chosen is proportionate the proposed gains. 
Adapting just war for just intelligence 
Reconceptualizing the idea of security 
In order to create this new ethical framework how we conceive of “security” needs 
reconceptualizing. While Zedner is correct in that security is another “promiscu-
ous concept” ( Zedner 2009 , 9) – ranging in content, referent object and means of 
provision8 – the value of security, and from there the right or expectation to have 
security, for this chapter is directly linked to the value that an individual has in 
maintaining their vital interests.9 That is, security is the condition by which one’s 
vital interests are maintained and protected. This means contemplating security 
as the processes and protections designed to maintain people’s vital interests. For 
example, at its core the vital interest in maintaining one’s physical integrity gives 
rise to the understanding of security as personal safety, thus “usually understood 
to refer to the protection against physical or other harm” and to provide secu-
rity therefore includes “the prevention of or resilience against deliberate attack” 
( Schneier 2006 , 12). 10 Or, in terms of privacy, security refers to the protections 
one has, both physically and symbolically, that prevent outsiders from intruding 
on private spaces or accessing personal information without authorization. 
Security is therefore not separate from people’s interests, but an overarching 
formula by which they are ensured, and the role of the state is to negotiate the 
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protections so that individuals can fulfil their own version of the good life. The 
provision of security means understanding the complex interrelation between an 
individual’s vital interests and offering them the necessary protections, and that 
harming someone is the way and degree to which these vital interests are violated. 
What this understanding provides is a way of detailing the impact, or harm, that 
intelligence can have on individuals, which can then be reconciled with the threat 
the intelligence community is seeking to prevent. Importantly, this means that 
security and human rights are not opposing attributes to be “balanced” against 
each other but are different aspects of the same phenomenon. Indeed, narratives 
that portray security and liberties as opposing qualities that must be traded or 
balanced, while pervasive, are dangerous ( Waldron 2003 ;  Pozen 2015 ;  McArthur 
2001 ). By framing it as a trade-off between privacy and security, where you can 
have either security or privacy but not both and, importantly, where security is 
seen as a trump card ( Thompson 2001 ;  Dragu 2011 ;  Bambauer 2013 ), 11 it is not 
surprising that “After 9/11 countries around the globe unhesitatingly adopted poli-
cies to enhance their government’s capacity to prevent terrorism . . . at the expense 
of individual civil liberties” ( Dragu 2011 ). 12 While Jeremy Waldron warns that 
even these framings are problematic in terms of unequal distribution of the trade-
off, unclear returns for any given exchange and the problem of trading liberties 
at will ( Waldron 2003 ), it is argued here that these framings fail to see how the 
matrix of vital interests should be taken as a whole, viewed holistically in order 
to provide an individual with enough of his vital interests that he can carry out his 
goals, and therefore be deemed secure. This means that “the overlapping or even 
isomorphic relationship between privacy and security is far more subtle than it 
might be imagined and cannot be glossed over by a rhetoric of ‘opposed’ rights or 
values of security and privacy” ( Raab 2017 ). 
Therefore, it is important to understand the harm that an intelligence activity 
represents through its aim of providing security to people so that this can be rec-
onciled with the harm that it seeks to prevent by forestalling a threat from being 
realized. As a process this means, first, recognizing that while some vital interests 
such as physical and mental integrity might appear to take precedence over the 
other interests such as autonomy, liberty, self-worth or privacy, they should be 
taken together as a complex matrix that all need to be maintained.13 That in main-
taining the security of the individual an excess of one vital interest will not neces-
sarily make up for the lacking of another interest: an excess of physical security 
cannot be used as a justification for undermining people’s privacy; it cannot be 
argued that people are physically very safe in exchange for having no privacy 
( Feinberg 1984 , 37;  Rescher 1972 , 5). 
Secondly, in making this calculation, it is important to understand that these 
vital interests are not binary, whole one minute and utterly destroyed the next, 
but exist to varying degrees given the context. The negotiation therefore involves 
understanding which and to what extent both the state and a perpetrator are threat-
ening vital interest(s). For example, privacy can be perceived as consisting of 
different levels where the more personal or intimate the information, the greater 
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must be a greater threat to someone’s other vital interests to justify the privacy 
intervention. Part of this negotiation is understanding whether the target has acted 
in some way so as to waive or forfeit their immediate vital interests, the potential 
threat to other people’s vital interests represented by the aggressing actor and that 
the state is itself not representing the greater threat to our vital interests. 
Proportional problems and proportional responses 
I have spoken elsewhere about a metaphorical “ladder of escalation” which can 
be used to separate out different intelligence collection activities according to the 
harm they cause, which can be set against the level of threat they seek to prevent. 
This flexibility allows for a differentiation across the large range of intelligence 
activities and situations with a flexible set of just intelligence principles, each with 
their own series of internal spectrums or proportional calculations. For example, 
in terms of just cause and self-defence the type of defence one should muster 
should be proportional to the type of threat. That is, if the threat is of lesser mag-
nitude than killing or severe suffering, while there might not be a justification to 
kill in self-defence there could be justification for a low-level physical response, 
loss of property and resources, or sanctions ( Pattison 2018 ). For intelligence, this 
means the justified intelligence activity should reflect the potential threat repre-
sented. Equally, for authority then different measures need to be in place to offer 
flexible but increasing oversight as the harm caused goes up, whereby the level of 
blame is not diminished but more securely located with those in charge. While for 
discrimination this allows those tangentially involved with a threat to be included 
for low-level intelligence activities, while being protected from more intrusive 
forms lest evidence shows they have a greater involvement. 
 Temporal quality 
One of the key differences between war and intelligence is that in the former the 
threat is relatively known, whereas intelligence activity can, and should, come 
long before the threat is known for it is the purpose of the intelligence operative to 
locate the threat in the first instance. Therefore, intelligence can involve targeting 
individuals before their threat status is known, which means decisions are being 
made on whether or not to use an intelligence activity before one is able to make 
an ethical calculation as to whether it is justified or not. In order to reconcile this 
it is necessary to think of intelligence as a form of pre-emptive or preventive 
self-defence. This is based on the argument that there is a distinction between 
“self-defence against present definite threats . . . definite future threats . . . as 
well as indefinite potential threats” ( Lee 2018 , 346; Walzer 2015 ). For example, 
pre-emptive self-defence counters threats that, while not realized, have a clear 
likelihood and close temporal quality, while preventive self-defence has a much 
broader temporal range, being years down the line or where it is unclear if the 
threat will materialize. By understanding intelligence as a flexible, proportional 
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gather initial information on a situation and target, and then use this information 
to either escalate up through more harmful intelligence activities or by abandon-
ing the target. 
Developing and applying just intelligence principles 
Following from these initial principles a set of “just intelligence principles” can 
be created. These principles reflect the underlying ethical arguments found within 
the just war tradition but are appropriately adapted for intelligence activity. These 
just intelligence principles are as follows ( Bellaby 2014 , 109): 
• Just cause: there must be a sufficient threat to justify the harm that might be 
caused by the intelligence collection activity. 
• Authority: there must be legitimate authority, representing the political com-
munity’s interests, sanctioning the activity. 
• Intention: the means should be used for the intended purpose and not for 
other (political, economic, social) objectives. 
• Proportionality: the harm that is perceived to be caused should be outweighed 
by the perceived gains. 
• Last resort: less harmful acts should be attempted before more harmful ones 
are chosen. 
• Discrimination: there should be discrimination between legitimate and ille-
gitimate targets. 
While a direct transfer of the just war tradition’s principles to just intelligence 
is both inaccurate and unhelpful, by following the underlying ethical arguments 
made they can be applied to different areas of intelligence activity. 
 Just cause 
The criteria of “just cause” is often considered to be one of the most important of 
the just war principles as it outlines the main reason for going to war and the main 
argument for its ethical justification. Over the years, acting in self-defence has 
been defined as the main, acceptable just cause for going to war. In comparison, 
the just cause equivalent for intelligence collection could be interpreted as pre-
venting the realization of a threat against the political community. This is because 
it is the role of the intelligence to firstly detect, provide information on and initiate 
some prevention of any and all threats that face the political community. In this 
way, depending on the nature of the threat, it can act as a just cause to justify the 
use of the intelligence activity and the harm it can cause. Therefore, by acting to 
detect and prevent these threats intelligence activity works as an act of a preven-
tive self-defence, averting the actualization of threats against the political com-
munity ( Bellaby 2014 , 26). 
However, protecting the political community is more than just protecting the 
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just cause is not necessarily to balance these, but to highlight what they are and 
interrogate them.14 Reconciling these different conceptions of security and deter-
mining if there is a suitable threat to the political community means understanding 
the threat from both other actors’ and the state’s own national security efforts if 
they excessively or unnecessarily violate people’s vital interests. For example, 
when the National Security Agency (NSA) programmes to collect as much infor-
mation as possible (through surveillance programs referred to as Upstream, Quan-
tuminsert, Tempora) were revealed, by doing this the intelligence services were 
seen to be significantly violating the privacy of people en masse ( Feinberg 1984 , 
35; Bellaby 2016 ). Therefore while there was not a just cause for such intelligence 
activity because there was no clear, direct threat to act as a justification, there is in 
fact a just cause for someone to reveal the information and blow the whistle given 
the harm being caused. What this means for intelligence is that there is actually 
a just cause for revealing the secret activity of the intelligence community when 
their activity itself represents a threat to the political community. When the state, 
or its representatives, is the source of an unjustified threat to the individual’s and 
society’s vital interests then there is a just cause to act. 
 Just authority 
In the just war tradition the principle of legitimate authority determines that in 
order for a war to be considered morally permissible it must be authorized by the 
right (or legitimate) authority. That is, those who have the right to command by 
virtue of their position: “since the care of the common weal is committed to those 
who are in the right authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal” 
( Aquinas 2002 , 214). This authorizing actor must have both the moral weight of 
representing and protecting the needs of the political community and ensuring 
practical considerations such as having the physical, intellectual and emotional 
ability to take into account the different factors involved while limiting personal 
costs or bias. While traditionally the legitimate authority rested with the state and 
its representatives as the most appropriate actor to fulfil these needs, this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. The state will often represent a good choice as it 
has extensive experience and a wide breadth of knowledge and in many instances 
is a manifestation of the political community’s best form of protection and ability 
to represent the wishes of the people. However, at its core the just war tradition 
seeks to place authority within those who best represent and will act in the inter-
ests of the political community and its people. What this means is that when the 
state fails in this task or begins to represent the source of the problem then there 
is a need to rest the legitimate authority elsewhere. 
Initially, therefore, this should (uncontentiously) mean bringing oversight out 
of the intelligence community’s purview as those planning, performing or manag-
ing operations have heavily invested interests. However, while this oversight has 
traditionally been placed predominantly in the hands of the executive, with addi-
tional oversight through the legislature and judiciary, historically many admin-
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repercussions for members of government and embarrassment for the administra-
tion as a whole ( Wells 2004 , 1203; Ambinder 2013 , 6). Existing institutions have 
proven unable to act without bias and act outside their political objectives, and 
are therefore ill-suited for balancing the ethical and security concerns. Indeed, 
Rahul Sagar has shown that in the United States “Given the President’s stronghold 
over the flow of national security information, there is little reason to believe that 
lawmakers will be able to take the lead in uncovering policies and actions” ( Sagar 
2016 , 128). 15 Whereas in terms of the judiciary he argues that “judges are not 
trained, and the courts not equipped, to make politically charged decisions about 
what state secrets are appropriate” coupled with a “judicial deference towards 
the executive’s claims about the harm likely to be caused by the disclosures” 
( Sagar 2016 , 74). Moreover, in those courts where the whole proceedings are kept 
secret – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court being a notable case – the 
secrecy limits opportunity for engaged reflection and debate on the legal inter-
pretation as judicial peer review and the right to appeal is prevented.16 What this 
highlights is that these existing political structures lack the physical power to keep 
the intelligence community in check, and are insufficient in manpower, intellec-
tual mandate or drive to do so or cannot separate their own political interests from 
their role as overseer. The problem seen is that the secrecy necessarily attached to 
intelligence is extended over the political oversight mechanisms, which in turn 
insulates them from the piercing power of democratic observation and rather than 
these actors interrogating intelligence they become habitualized by a national 
security elitism that distorts their oversight role. 
Rather, there needs to be a new, proactive and imbedded set of oversight mech-
anisms to systematically examine conduct and information collected to determine 
if it should be released or not.17 In designing this new oversight actor several prin-
ciples can be highlighted. First, at its core the principle of legitimate authority dis-
tils the idea that the review should be examined before rather than after the event. 
The wars must pass the initial criteria before any attack is deemed legitimate. This 
means that the review should be penetrative. The oversight actor should have the 
power and expectation to review operations, policies, practices and trends within 
the intelligence community in real time, including whether there are tendencies 
towards too much secret keeping as well as acting to review individual cases to 
determine if they should keep the information or not. 
Secondly, since the authority should represent the political community, it does 
not have to be limited to state representatives nor do they necessarily have to be 
elected or subject to populous demands – as restricting it in this way can be more 
detrimental to the actual review. Therefore, alternative representative mecha-
nisms can be utilized such as using legal, moral and societal experts or repre-
sentatives, chosen because of their expertise rather than because of their elected 
status. In order to avoid the same popular pressures faced by elected officials 
they should not be subjected to direct democratic elections, but rather represent 
experts in the relevant fields of intelligence oversight, preferably legally trained, 
nominated and confirmed by the legislative in a public debate where their suit-
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Thirdly, to limit the distortive effect of political interference the body should be 
able to determine for itself what information should be released free from political 
censure. If it detects intelligence activity that contravenes the principles outlined 
in the other criteria it should be free to determine for itself what to reveal accord-
ing to the interests of the community and free from worries of political scandal. 
 Last resort 
In the just war tradition the need that war only be undertaken as a last resort is an 
attempt to allow those means that can cause a lower level of harm, like diplomacy 
or economic pressure, to be given a chance to resolve the issue before the higher 
harms seen in war are permitted. This way the more harmful acts are avoided 
if possible. Based on this conception of last resort, one can argue for a similar 
rationale for the just intelligence principles. In order for an intelligence collection 
means to be just it must only be used once other less harmful means have been 
exhausted or are redundant. In this way, the principle of last resort ensures that the 
intelligence collection means with the lowest level harm is used first in an attempt 
to deal with the threat, and thus give the opportunity for more harmful activities 
to be avoided. While there is no rigid methodology or steps that must be worked 
through, it does require that some of the more harmful actions are not resorted to 
out of ease or expediency. 
Proportionality 
The idea of proportionality is one of the oldest principles not only of the just war 
tradition but also of moral theory and armed strategy in general. Leaders and 
individuals alike often weigh up the costs of an action against what can be gained 
from it. The notion of proportionality seeks to ensure that the harm caused in war 
is proportionate to the threat that it is meant to overcome, placing a limit on the 
amount of harm allowed for a given action. What is important is that all the harms 
are included in the calculation and only those benefits that are directly linked 
to the just cause should count ( Hurka 2005 ;  McKenna 1960 ;  Regan 1996 ). For 
example, in terms of war while we would not consider the boost to the economy 
as a relevant good, the fact that it might hurt the economy would be counted as 
a negative. Therefore, while wider damages can be included when assessing the 
need to release the information only specific goods directly relating to the just 
cause can be included when arguing for information retention. 
Similar to the consequentialist calculation one can argue that in order for the 
intelligence collection to be just the level of harm that one perceives to be caused 
by the collection should be outweighed by the perceived gains. As David Omand 
asks, “is the likely impact of the proposed intelligence gathering operation, taking 
account of the methods to be used, in proportion to the seriousness of the business 
at hand in terms of the harm it seeks to prevent?” ( Omand 2007 , 162). On the one 
hand the costs and gains can be examined in terms of Herman’s “balance sheet” 
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can be integrated into an ethical balance sheet” ( Herman 2002 , 290). This moral 
accounting allows us to balance the overall good effect of intelligence knowledge 
against some of the less desirable methods. If it is discovered “at the bottom of 
the ledger that the benefits of intelligence knowledge is found to be in credit, then 
the means employed to gather intelligence can be morally justified by the positive 
impact of knowledge acquired” ( Erskine 2004 , 366). 
In addition to these direct costs, however, we need to include wider costs such 
as the impact on individuals’ autonomy, society, degradation to important social 
norms and practices and the cohesion of the political community. Richard Mat-
thews argues that no individual is an island, but is a part of a complex set of social 
networks that are also damaged when someone is affected by intelligence prac-
tice: “its run-on effect is well documented and involves wide-ranging pain and 
suffering across the communities and contexts” ( Matthews 2012 , 466). For exam-
ple, additional costs associated with intelligence collection activities can include 
degradation to social cohesion as minorities are over-represented and excessively 
targeted, marginalizing them from the greater social whole and reinforcing dis-
torted criminal statistics, often with individuals unaware that their information is 
being used ( Bennetto 2005 , 5). 
Discrimination 
The requirement that an attack must discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants is one of the most stridently codified just war rules and is reflected 
in the international law of war as such. Soldiers charged with the deployment of 
force and violence cannot do so indiscriminately. They have an obligation to exert 
a particular effort to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. The 
target has to have “something about them” to justify being a legitimate target 
( Nagel 1979 , 124). That is, either the target represented a threat of some form and 
attacking him is justified as an act of self-defence, or that when the individual 
became a soldier he waived his normal protective rights in some way. 
For intelligence one can argue that, just as soldiers are legitimate targets 
because they are a threat and they give up certain protective rights, arguably any 
individual can act in a way as to make themselves a threat or to forfeit certain 
protective rights. Holding a particular job; being in possession of important infor-
mation and being a member of a state’s infrastructure are all examples of how 
an individual can make himself liable for the threat or consent to the waiving or 
forfeiting of certain rights. For example, “consent to participate in the world of 
national security on all levels of a country’s self-defence structure together with 
the quality of the information possessed” puts the individual liable to the threat 
and as such justifies them as targets ( Pfaff and Tiel 2004 , 6). 
Notes 
1 For a summary of the various different historical thematic and contemporary intellectual 
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2 For political use, see Kelsay (2013 ). For the principle of discrimination, see Article 48, 
first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle of proportionality, 
see Article 51(4b), first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions; for the principle 
of just cause, see Article 51 UN Charter. 
3 For example, see Lowe (2003 ),  Walzer (2006 ), Crawford (2003 ), Sussmann (2013 ), 
 Valls (2000 ) and  Steinhoff (2004 ). 
4 For example, see  Williams (2015 ). 
5 For example, see van der Bruggen (2013 ). 
6 For example, see  Fitzsimmons (2015 ) and  Pattison (2008 ). 
7 For example, see  Meisels (2014 ) and  Scheid (2012 ). 
8 For work on “security studies” and the changes in referent object, the construction of 
security threats and security actors, see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1997 ),  Browning 
and McDonald (2011 )  and Katzenstein (1996 ). 
9 For more on there being a “right” to security, see  Lazarus (2007 ), ( 2012 ). 
10 This is different from the instrumentalist arguments made by people such as Henry Shue 
whereby security is necessary for the enjoyment of other rights. See Lazarus (2012 ). 
11 For arguments against security necessarily trumping privacy, see  Moore (2011 ). For 
arguments for security trumping privacy, see  Himma (2007 ). 
12 Also see  Ackerman (2006 ) and  Hardin (2004 ). 
13 Isaiah Berlin declared that in much the same way that boots were more important than 
the words of Shakespeare, liberty and autonomy are not necessarily the total first needs 
of an individual ( Berlin 1969 , 124). 
14 For McMahan the principle of proportionality is therefore directly connected to the prin-
ciple of just cause as it enables the balancing of the just cause against the various poten-
tial harm to be caused by the act of war ( McMahan 2005 ). 
15 Also see  Born (2003 , 22). 
16 For the role of the right to appeal and the importance of multi-layered court systems, see 
Dalton (1985 ),  Lennerfors (2007 )  and Nobles and Schiff (2002 ). 
17 This builds on Rahul Sagar’s discussion on the limits of retrospection as a form of over-
sight ( Sagar 2007 , 414–17). 
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